Ok, away from politics, and back to the good stuff. When I left off talking about
encryption, we were looking at
RSA, as an example of an asymmetric encryption system.
Since it's been a while, I'll start off with a quick review of RSA.
Asymmetric encryption systems like RSA are based on computations that are easy to perform if you know the keys, and incredibly hard to perform if you don't. In the specific case
of RSA, everything is based on a pair of very large prime numbers. If you know those two
primes, and you know the public key, it's really easy to compute the private key. But
if you don't know the two prime numbers, then even given the public key,
it's incredibly difficult to compute the private key.
To be a bit more specific, in RSA, you get a pair of large prime numbers, P and Q. You
compute from them a totient of their product, which is the number
N=(P-1)×(Q-1). Then you arbitrarily pick a public exponent, E, which is
smaller than N, and which is prime relative to N. You can then compute
the private key exponent, D. If you know what P and Q are, it's pretty easy to compute
Once you've got D and E, your public key is the pair is (N,E), and the private key is the pair is (N,D).
If you've got a plaintext message M, then encrypting it with the public key
is done by computing ME mod N. If you've got a ciphertext C encrypted
with the public key, then decrypting it is done by computing CD mod N.
Encrypting a plaintext with the public key is exactly the same process
as decrypting a ciphertext produced with the private key. And vice versa.
RSA is amazingly elegant. Every time I look at it for any reason, I'm struck
by its beauty and it's simplicity. It's really an amazing example of how
something seemingly abstract like number theory can produce practical, down-to-earth,
But RSA isn't perfect. In fact, it's got a some rather serious problems that
are a direct result of its mathematical structure. I'm just going to mention
one, but there are several of them.
Suppose you've got your public/private keypair. You want to encrypt two messages, I
and J with your private key. Let's call the function for encrypting a message
with the private key E - so E(M) = MD mod N. Then
CI = E(I), and CJ=E(J). Good so far.
The problem is that given those two messages - for which an attacker has access to both
the plaintext and the ciphertext - it happens that there's a vulnerability. Because of the
way that encryption works, E(I×J) = E(I) × E(J)!
This opens you up to something called chosen ciphertext attacks. A chosen
ciphertext attack is one where you attack an crytographic system by running chosen
ciphertexts through the decryption system to see if you can compute the encryption key.
There's an effective attack against the naive use of RSA based on a selected ciphertext
In addition to this, there are a few other interesting attacks that I won't describe in
detail. They all rely on various problems of the numerical structure of RSA encryption. In
order to defeat those attacks, RSA is typically used with something called a padding
scheme. The idea of the padding scheme is twofold. First, it increases the size of the
message - which guarantees that the encrypted message is large enough that it will not be
easy to use for an attack. Second, it intersperses pseudo-random information in a way that
means that a given plaintext message could be encrypted to a wide range of different
ciphertexts, depending on the choices made during padding.
A common scheme for padding is OAEP - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding. OAEP
is a basic Feistel network system, like the ones I described when I was talking
about DES. OAEP ends up doing a mixture of permuting the plaintext, and
adding pseudo-random noise to it. It's a reversible transformation,
and the receiver of the encrypted message (and thus any attacker) knows how to
do the reversal of the padding given the decrypted plaintext. But the process
of permutation and random injection performed by the padding has the effect
of breaking the properties of RSA that make it easy to attack the system.
For example, suppose that the padding function is called P. E(P(I))×E(P(J)) is
not equal to E(P(I×J)). Similarly, the message-size-related problems
with RSA are not usable on messages whose size is increased past the vulnerability threshold
using OAEP padding.
So what does the padding look like? Let's start with the pieces.
- You have a number, N, which is the length of the cryptographic modulus.
- You have two integers, k0 and k1, which are parameters
of the protocol in use.
- You have the original plaintext message, M. By definition, the length of M is
(n - k0 - k1). (The protocol is responsible for breaking
up large messages into sub-messages via an appropriate mode of operation.)
- You have a 0-padded version of M, M', which is M followed by k1
zeros - so M' has length N-k0.
- You have a random string of bits, r, which has length k0.
- You have a cryptographic hash function G, which expands a string of
k0 bits to a string of N-k0 bits.
- You have another cryptographic hash function H, which contracts
a string of n-k0 bits to a srting of k0 bits.
The OAEP padding algorithm is illustrated off to the side. The way that
it works is: you compute G(r), giving you a string of N-k0 bits.
You XOR G(r) with M', producing a string of N-k0 bits, which we'll
call X. Then compute H(X), and XOR that with r, producing a result that we'll call
Y. The end result of the padding is the concatenation of X and Y.
The way to understand this is that you've got some random bits in R, which you're shuffling up (using G and H) and mixing with the bits of the original message. The resulting message is longer, and has a random element mixed into it, which defeats the numerical properties that make some attacks against RSA work. It's easy to compute
X and Y given M and r. And given X and Y, if you know G and H it's easy to compute
M and r. But given E(X concat Y), as an attacker, you're screwed. You can
still decript the message, and get X and Y, decode them, and get the plaintext. But
the process of doing the padding obscures the numerical properties of RSA so that
even knowing the padding function, your attacks won't work.